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Abstract
Evolutionary theory predicts humans to be more altruistic towards genetically more closely related kin. Because fathers face
uncertainty about the relation to their children, the asymmetric parental altruism hypothesis predicts mothers to provide a
higher share of parental care than fathers. We tested this hypothesis using parental choice experiments in rural Tanzania, in
which fathers and mothers could choose between an outcome that benefited themselves and an outcome that benefited
their children. When a parent was solely responsible for the outcome, mothers chose more altruistic than fathers. However
when the choice situation was changed into a coordination game in which responsibility was shared with the partner, the
sex difference disappeared. Fathers then chose somewhat more altruistic, but mothers substantially less. Our findings thus
partly support the asymmetric parental altruism hypothesis, but they also show that parental altruism is influenced by the
context in which choices are taken.
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Introduction
The pattern of human parental investments deviates from that
of other mammals in its exceptionally high paternal contribution
[1]–[3]. This raises the question of how the parental investments
are divided between fathers and mothers. Due to paternity
uncertainty, the expected benefits from caring for offspring in
terms of inclusive fitness are smaller for fathers than for mothers
[4]. Also other facts of human reproductive biology, like high
female initial investments into offspring (up to the pregnancy and
lactation period) and low life-time fertility potential relative to
males, might point towards sex asymmetry in parental investments
[5]. These arguments can be summarized as the asymmetric
parental altruism (APA) hypothesis, which proposes human
parental investments by mothers to be higher than by fathers.
This hypothesis has received indirect empirical support from
various angles. The extent of altruism between benefactors and
beneficiaries has been found to depend on the degree of their
relatedness [6]–[8]. Survival of children has been identified to
depend predominantly on care by matrilineal kin [9], [10]. And,
paternity uncertainty has been identified as predictor of paternal
investments [11], [12]. The relevance of paternity uncertainty in
the functioning of human societies was also found reflected in the
widely spread sexual taboos [13], or in bans on promiscuity [14],
[15] that can both be linked to paternity assurance. A controlled
parent level test of the APA hypothesis is however not yet
available.
The APA hypothesis plays not only a role in the evolutionary
literature and anthropology, but has also been incorporated into
models of economic decision-making, where it gained indirect
support from studies on family consumption patterns [16]–[19].
This step represented an innovation of the traditional perspective
in economics of the family as an atomic decision-making unit, in
which parents were supposed to share the same altruistic
preferences [20]–[23]. The question of whether mothers tend to
invest more in their children than fathers is highly relevant for
advising policy makers. When designing interventions for families
living at the edge of poverty, it is important to know whether
economic transfers should target the family as a whole or one
specific parent [24].
In this paper we test the APA hypothesis by performing
incentivized parental choice experiments in rural areas of
Tanzania. To test for sex differences in egoistic versus altruistic
parental decision making, we designed a one-parent treatment
where unrelated fathers and mothers had to make a decision that
could affect the welfare of their children. This treatment was
designed to measure differences between mothers’ and fathers’
willingness to place their children’s welfare above their own
welfare, when holding full responsibility for such decision.
Family context
Human parental decisions relevant for their offspring are often
not taken in a vacuum but within the context of a family. From an
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evolutionary perspective, circumstances that supported the evolu-
tion of our large brain led us to excel in skills like speech and the
formation and manipulation of social relationships [25]–[28]. It
has been argued that these skills, in conjunction with other aspects
of our evolutionary past – like intergroup competition and
intragroup cohesion of kin-related males – are responsible for
the emergence of stable parental bonds as an environment in
which both parents invest into several offspring in a row.
Consequently, the trade-off between parenting and mating in
humans not only involves short term but also long term
considerations [29]. The parental bonding in a family increases
paternity certainty [30]; compensating fathers’ fitness loss when
foregoing external mating opportunities and investing into long-
run parental care. Such advantages are likely to accrue in co-
evolution with female preference for faithfulness [31].
The fact that parental decisions take place in the context of a
family may have consequences for the symmetry of parental
investments in their offspring. These consequences are however
not addressed by parental altruism models that focus solely on the
biology of human reproduction [32]. Family, as an environment
which facilitates repeated interaction among parents, represents a
mini-universe where parental decisions are likely to be shaped by
mechanisms evolved in humans as social species [29], [30]. Next to
testing the APA hypothesis, we therefore also test whether and
how parental altruistic preferences interact with the context of
human bi-parental care, taking place in a family.
To do so, we contrast two treatments. First, our one-parent
treatment, where fathers and mothers had to choose between an
outcome that benefited themselves and an outcome that benefited
their children, without any involvement of their partner. Second, a
both-parents treatment where the same decision was made by both
parents of a couple, who knew that their partner was making a
decision, but did not know what their partner chose. In the second
treatment, the parents’ beliefs and expectations about the behavior
of the other parent - both in the experiment and after the
experiment - may affect their behavior.
In the one-parent treatment, the situation is rather simple. Each
parent has sole responsibility for the outcome and has to opt for
the altruistic alternative if placing the welfare of a child over their
own welfare. Furthermore, any parent can choose the selfish
alternative without expecting blame or negative reaction from
their partner for doing so. The decisions made by the parents in
this treatment reveal their parental altruism under minimal social
interference.
In the both-parent treatment, the situation is more complex, as
the expectation of spousal approval or disapproval is now likely to
affect the parent’s choice as well. Moreover, both parents might
prefer an outcome where at least one of them chooses the altruistic
alternative, but at the same time, each parent might prefer that it is
the other parent making the investment. This situation represents
in game-theoretic terms a coordination problem, which can be
modeled as the ‘‘game of chicken’’ or as the ‘‘battle of the sexes’’,
depending on whether the parents decisions are formulated in
terms of the actions they choose (care/no care), or in terms of the
sex-specific parental care norms (father cares/mother cares) [33].
The core of the problem is that each parent prefers the care to
be provided by the other parent, while also the risk exists that no
care is provided at all. Culturally determined sex roles may be
important in this situation as well. Fathers might choose more
egoistically than mothers, if they assume that it is a mother’s task to
care for the children. Mothers may choose more egoistically than
fathers, if they consider it a father’s task to provide for the family.
Besides the short-run outcome, parents may also take potential
future consequences of the decision into account. For example,
expectations of negative reaction from their partner, after
revealing no willingness to share responsibility, might lead them
to choose the altruistic alternative. Our study of parental altruism
in a family context is also in line with integrative approaches in
evolutionary literature [34], [35], which call for considering a
richer set of reproductive strategies when addressing differential
parental investment behavior.
Decisions in human parental pairs are likely to depend on a
range of factors that are absent when the parent is solely
responsible for the outcome of the decision. To increase our
understanding of the relevance of these factors, decisions of
parents deciding alone will be compared with those made in the
both-parent situation.
Materials and Methods
The experiment took place in two neighboring regions in the
North-Western part of Tanzania: Mwanza and Kagera. These are
relatively small regions, representing 2.3% and 3.2% of the total
land area of Tanzania mainland, respectively. Both are largely
agricultural, with the exception of urban aggregations around a
few cities. We selected six wards for our experiments, of which two
in Mwanza and four in Kagera. Before starting the experiments,
we ran test and training sessions in two other wards in the
proximity of Mwanza city.
The participants in the experiment were recruited under the
approval and with help of village leaders. Individual verbal
consent was sought and obtained from study participants prior to
their participation in the experimental games and survey
interviews. We opted for verbal consent, because a substantial
part of the people in the area of our study are illiterate and thus
could not read the content of a written consent form. Because
asking potential participants to sign a form they could not read
would easily raise fear in them, we decided to use verbal consent in
the local language to the local interviewers and to record the
names of the consenting individuals in our logbook.
At each location, we performed two sessions; one in the
morning and one in the afternoon. To prevent the spread of
information from the morning session to the afternoon session,
there was only a short break between the two sessions. The
participants arrived at a central place in the ward, and were
brought to a sheltered place (local school, church building), where
the experiments could take place without intervention of non-
participants. In all sessions we had the help of 10 trained assistants
who were fluent in English and local language(s), and had previous
experience with data collection in questionnaire studies.
At the start of a session, an assistant thanked to the participants
in local language for their arrival. Then participants participated
in another incentivized experiment, not discussed in this paper.
This took about 45 minutes. The participants received no
feedback about the outcome of this experiment before making
the decision discussed in this paper. Between the events, there was
a break of at least half an hour, involving time to relax and enjoy a
small refreshment, and to answer a one-on-one questionnaire on
demographic data. In this way, the two incentivized decisions were
separated in time and context.
At the start of the session, we announced that the order of
leaving the session would depend on the length of the question-
naire study, and that completing the questionnaire for men would
take longer than for women. In that way, we created public
knowledge that the women would leave the session before the
men. We also asked the participants to leave the session location
completely when they were dismissed and not to wait for other
participants. In this way, we strived to guarantee that any decisions
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of parents, in particular mothers, would not be affected by the
pressure of their partners waiting for them. The experimental
group consisted of 188 parents (95 fathers and 93 mothers) with at
least one child below the age of 10.
The game we implemented in the experiment was a modified
dictator game. In the standard dictator game [36], the dictator is
asked to divide a cash amount between him- or herself and a
passive recipient. Transfers of the dictator to the recipient are
interpreted as a measure of the dictator’s altruism. In our study,
parents were assigned the role of dictator and asked to make a
decision affecting their own welfare as well as the welfare of one of
their children. We used two treatments of this game. In the one-
parent treatment, we invited only one parent from a family to
participate; either the father or the mother. In the both-parents
treatment, we invited both parents to participate. In the one-parent
treatment the partners of the participants were not explicitly
informed about the participation of their partner (although they
might have heard about it after the experiment). In the both-
parents treatment, the parents knew that their partner was
participating in the choice experiment, but the partner was not
present in the decision situation.
The choice task faced by the participants was as follows. We
called the participants one by one to an isolated place, thanked
them for their time and stated that as a reward, we would like to
offer them the possibility to choose one out of two or three
alternatives. In each of the sessions one of these alternatives was
suitable exclusively as a consumption good for a child, namely a
type of slippers worn by children in that area. The other
alternative(s) were consumption good(s) that did not explicitly
target the welfare of a child and could be consumed by the
decision maker - an amount of cash and/or half a kilo of sugar
(depending on availability). We also showed a bag with slippers in
different (children’s) sizes and colors, stating that they could choose
slippers of another size or color than the one displayed. After the
participant had made a choice and had left the building, the
chosen alternative chosen was registered by the experimenters.
The slippers had a higher market value than the other non-cash
alternative (sugar) and the cash amount. The purchase value of the
slippers was about 1500 Tanzanian schilling, while the value of the
sugar was about 1000 Tanzanian shilling, and the cash offered was
between 500 and 800 Tanzanian shilling (depending on the
banknote availability at the local bank). Choosing the slippers thus
resulted in foregoing possible economic benefits for the parents
themselves, in exchange for a more expensive good that can be
consumed by (one of) their children.
We chose slippers as the child consumption good, because they
considerably increase the welfare of children in the study area,
who have to walk daily large distances, e.g. to go to school or for
fetching water. The slippers are a valuable object. A large number
of children in the areas of our experiment walked barefoot and half
of our participants reported to have at least one child currently
walking barefoot. Children with slippers often had old and worn
ones. In order to prevent transfer of slippers to adults, the slippers
from which the parents could choose were only available in sizes
suitable for children, approximately aged two to ten. The
participants were allowed to pick the desired slippers by size and
color.
Analysis
The data were analyzed using cross-tabulations and logistic
regression analysis. We report Fisher’s exact tests for contrasts
between categories of subjects (per sex or per treatment). In the
logistic regression models, the dependent variable was a binary
variable indicating whether (1) or not (0) a parent would choose
slippers instead of the selfish alternative (money or sugar).
Independent variables were indicators for sex (mother versus
father), treatment (one-parent versus both-parents), age of the
parent and number of children under 10. The models also
included fixed effects dummies to control for the (measured and
unmeasured) differences among the six wards. To test for variation
in sex differences between the one-parent and both-parents
treatment, also the coefficient for the interaction between sex
and treatment was added to the model. To obtain coefficients and
standard errors for all theoretically relevant contrasts among the
variables, several models with opposite coding of the sex,
treatment and ward indicators [37] were estimated. For two
women whose age was missing, average women’s age in the
treatment was substituted. Summary statistics of the data are
presented in Table 1.
Prior to the study we obtained a research permit from the
Commission for Science and Technology Tanzania (COSTECH)
and our study, including the described consent procedure, was
approved by and received ethical clearance from Muhimbili
University of Health and Allied Sciences (MUHAS) Institutional
Review Board in Dar-es-Salaam. We further obtained permission
to conduct the study from the district, ward and village authorities.
Data availability
The data reported in this paper are available from the
corresponding author upon request.
Results
For each parent, we observed the outcome of the choice
between the altruistic and the more egoistic reward in the decision
task. Bivariate analyses indicate that, on average, mothers were
more altruistic than fathers; 63% of mothers and 46% of fathers
were making the altruistic choice (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.020).
This finding supports the asymmetric altruism hypothesis.
However, this sex difference in parental altruism turned out to
be only present in the one-parent treatment (where 71% of
mothers versus 42% of fathers chooses altruistic, p = 0.006). In the
both-parents treatment, the sex difference in altruism was not
significant any more (56% of mothers versus 51% of fathers
chooses altruistic; p = 0.683). Hence we only found support for the
APA hypothesis in the one-parent treatment. These observations
are summarized in Figure 1.
To find out whether the bivariate findings remain intact in a
multivariate analysis, Table 2 presents the results of logistic
regression analyses with the outcome of the parental choice
(altruistic versus egoistic) as dependent variable. Independent
variables are sex, treatment, parental age, number of children
under ten, and indicator variables for the differences among the
wards where the experiments took place. Two models were
estimated. Model 1 contained only the main effects of the
independent variables. Model 2 contained besides these main
effects also an interaction coefficient, testing for the existence of
sex differences between the treatment groups.
Model 1 makes clear that the significant sex difference in
parental altruism observed in the bivariate analysis is also present
when controlling for other important factors in the multivariate
model. The significant positive effect of the sex variable shows that
mothers choose significantly more for the slippers than fathers.
This is in line with the APA hypothesis.
Regarding the other variables in the model, we observe that the
coefficient for treatment is not significant. Hence on average there
was no difference in altruism between parents who took the
decision alone and parents who knew that their partner was
Mothers More Altruistic Only When Bearing Responsibility Alone
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e99952
making the same choice. As could be expected, parents with more
children under ten significantly more often choose for the slippers.
There were also some significant differences in altruism among the
wards where the experiments were held, but the effect of parental
age was not significant.
Model 2 shows that the coefficient of the interaction of sex with
treatment is significantly positive. This means that the difference
between fathers and mothers in altruism differs significantly
between the one-parent and the two-parent session. To gain more
insight into the pattern of these differences, we have computed
coefficients for the theoretically most important comparisons on
the basis of Model 2. These coefficients are presented in Table 3.
In Comparison 1, we look at the effect of sex while pooling the
data from the one-parent and both-parents treatment. Given the
significant positive coefficient of this comparison, we are tempted
to conclude that there are indeed sex differences in parental
altruism, with mothers being significantly more altruistic than
fathers. However, Table 3 also shows that this sex difference is
only present in the one-parent treatment (Comparison 2) and not
in the both-parents treatment (Comparison 3). This is in line with
the findings of the bivariate analysis. When the participants know
that their partner is making the same choice, the sex difference
disappears (almost) completely.
What is happening here? Is it the fathers who in the both-
parents treatment are more altruistic, the mothers who are less
altruistic, or both groups moving to the middle? The coefficients of
Comparisons 4 and 5 reveal the second option to be the case.
Whereas the fathers seem somewhat more altruistic in the both-
parents treatment, the mothers choose substantially and signifi-
cantly less altruistic in that treatment compared to the one-parent
treatment. Hence it is the mothers who mostly change their
behavior when their partner is present and that change is in the
egoistic direction.
Discussion
We report data from parental choice experiments collected in
rural Tanzania. Evolutionary biology argues that male uncertainty
about parenthood implies less altruism towards offspring in fathers
than in mothers. So far, only indirect evidence for this hypothesis
was available. We provide new experimental evidence.
In our experiments we compare two treatments in which
parents make a decision affecting the welfare of their children. In
the first treatment, the parent making the decision bears sole
responsibility for the outcome of the decision. This one-parent
treatment allows us to test the asymmetric parental altruism
hypothesis rather strictly, i.e. with little social interference. In the
second treatment, both parents make the same decision simulta-
neously, though independent of each other. In this both-parents
treatment, the parents are faced with a more complex coordina-
tion problem in which responsibility is shared. In this situation, not
only the outcome for the children, but also the consequences for
the parent in the parental pair might influence the decision.
In line with the APA hypothesis, we find that mothers are
significantly more likely than fathers to trade off their own welfare
for the welfare of their children. However, this asymmetry
prevailed only in the one-parent treatment. If both partners
participated, the difference between mothers and fathers disap-
peared. Moreover, the mechanism was driven by mothers
decreasing their altruism in the both-parents treatment, relative
to the one-parent treatment.
Hence, it seems that involvement of the partner decreased
altruism among the mothers. This raises the question why this
would be the case. As suggested in the introduction, it is possible
that these mothers more easily made a selfish choice, because
responsibility was shared and there was a chance that the partner
would choose altruistically. Alternative explanations are that they
considered it their husband’s task to provide for the family, or that
they expected their partner to choose selfish and did not want to
be worse-off than him. The latter explanation of mothers’
pessimistic expectations with respect to the partner’s behavior is
in line with cooperation of heterogeneous groups in Nairobi slums
[38]. And, the slight increase in altruism of males suggests that the
consequences of not providing parental care in a pair might play a
role, although in this experiment clearly not a role of much
importance. The decisions of fathers might also be affected by the
Table 1. Summary statistics.







Age, mean (SD) 37,4 (10,94)












Number of participants 188
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099952.t001
Figure 1. Percentage of altruistic choices by mothers and
fathers per treatment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099952.g001
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certainty of parentage, which is unobservable in this study, or by
incentives to signal own quality by providing parental care [35].
The validity of our findings might be affected by three
important sources of bias. First, it is possible that slippers were
chosen for their resale value instead of for use by the participant’s
children. Second, it is possible that the egoistic alternative (money
or sugar) was in fact chosen on behalf of the children instead of for
the parents themselves. And, third, it is possible that the observed
differences between fathers and mothers are in fact more general
differences between males and females.
The last option could not further be studied in our experimental
setting, as our setup was specifically designed for use with parents.
However, the other issues could be addressed to a certain extent by
validity tests. In one of these tests, we asked a sample of parents
without children under ten (28 males and 36 females) to make the
same choice between slippers for young children and the more
selfish alternative. It turned out that of these parents only 22%
choose the more valuable slippers (against 55% of the parents with
children under 10). This difference is statistically significant
(Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.000).
Whether the parents without children under 10 who choose the
slippers did so for egoistic reasons (hence the resale value) is not
clear. They may have chosen them also for other altruistic reasons,
for example for their grandchildren. However the fact that these
parents opted significantly less for the slippers than parents with
young children supports the idea that the last group indeed chose
the slippers for their children. This idea is further strengthened by
anecdotic evidence obtained by observing the parents. They often
went through a batch of slippers, comparing sizes and colors
before making a choice, while smiling in the process of doing that.
The second possibility – that some seemingly egoistic choices
could have had unobserved altruistic motives – cannot be ruled
out completely. It is very well possible that in some cases parent
choose cash to satisfy an urgent need of a child. However, such a
situation would probably bias the outcomes towards lower
identified altruism for mothers compared to fathers, as females
in these areas tend to have less access to cash. Given that
significantly less mothers than fathers opted for the egoistic
alternative, unobserved altruistic motives do not seem to have
played a role of importance.
Independent of the mechanism at play, the parental decision-
making in a context of parental pairs was not in line with the APA
hypothesis. This indicates that asymmetry in parental altruism
may be overruled by factors driving parental behavior in a family
context. Hence, interventions targeting the welfare of children are
not only influenced by whether the mother or father takes the
decision, but also by the circumstances in which the decision
making takes place. When both parents are involved, the outcome
may be less favorable for children than when mothers are solely
responsible.
Table 2. Logistic regression models estimating the probability of the altruistic choice (child size slippers) by a parent.
Model 1 Model 2
coeff. p-value coeff. p-value
Sex (female vs. male) 0,726 0,040 0,742 0,038
Treatment (one-parent vs. both-parents) 0,248 0,449 0,283 0,395
Sex * Treatment 1,380 0,040
Number of children under 10 0,335 0,033 0,348 0,030
Age of the parent 20,006 0,735 20,007 0,694
Ward 1 0,383 0,271 0,354 0,315
Ward 2 21,752 0,000 21,853 0,000
Ward 3 1,067 0,008 1,110 0,006
Ward 4 0,049 0,904 0,100 0,809
Ward 5 20,255 0,472 20,222 0,537
Ward 6 0,508 0,130 0,512 0,131
N 188 188
22 Log likelihood 222,635 217,312
Nagelkerke R square 0,240 0,265
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099952.t002
Table 3. Coefficients of theoretically most important comparisons based on Model 2.
Comparison Coeff. p-value
(1) All mothers compared to all fathers 0,742 0,038
(2) In one-parent treatment, mothers compared to fathers 1,439 0,004
(3) In both-parents treatment, mothers compared to fathers 0,059 0,901
(4) Fathers in both-parents treatment compared to one-parent treatment 0,399 0,380
(5) Mothers in both-parents treatment compared to one-parent treatment 20,981 0,046
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0099952.t003
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